On the morning of 11 September 2008, Luis Ernesto Derbez gave a keynote address at a Latin American conference on UNM's campus. Dr. Derbez was the Secretary of Economy and Secretary of Foreign Relations under former Mexican President Vicente Fox. He is currently the president of the University of the Americas in Mexico.
What follows is an English-language paraphrasing of Dr. Derbez's speech. The words are mine, but the concepts, structure and examples are from his address. In only a few places have I editorialized, and those thoughts appear parenthetically and italicized. This essay tries to reflect the content of Dr. Derbez's speech; I take full blame for any unintentional misrepresentations.LATIN AMERICA IS IRRELEVANT
Derbez began his speech with the declaration that Latin America is irrelevant. The continent is irrelevant on the world stage of geopolitics. That is, it does not have an influential voice in major world decisions.
For starters, Latin America is not represented on the UN Security Council, an agenda setting body with overwhelming veto power. Another among myriad examples of Latin America's irrelevance is that its participation in the failed Doha Round was largely marginal, with Brazil playing a small but inconsequential role.
Latin America is irrelevant because, in this emergent multi-polar world, it has not sufficiently integrated to constitute a major block that can articulate its shared interests in a forceful and coherent way. As they engage in diplomatic negotiation and statecraft, the prepotent regional poles of power do not have to seriously heed Latin America as an equal. The formidable positions of the US, the European Union, the Russia Federation, China and India demand careful consideration by all parties. Latin America, on the other hand, has not achieved such status due to its incomplete integration.
Derbez says that the obstacles to integration stem from three situations currently encountered in Latin America: disagreement and competition among divergent models of integration, the failures of Latin American businesses, and the still wanting democratic character of Latin American nations.
As Latin America confronts the need to integrate, its various players have initiated different models for regional integration. First there is the NAFTA model, which represents the traditional posture of turning towards the US. Because of an entangled history and geographic determinism, Mexico is torn between this US-centric model and one that looks south for alliances. The problem with the NAFTA model is that it would necessarily subordinate a Latin American block to the North American block in global interactions.
An alternative option for integration is MERCOSUR, which is the South American free trade organization spearheaded by Brazil. Although its locus of power is decidedly southern, it is similar to NAFTA in that it remains trade focused and relies on nation-states as the units of membership.
The third model of Latin American integration is represented by ALBA, the "Bolivarian" alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas, rolled out by Venezuela and Cuba, and now counting Nicaragua and Bolivia as members. ALBA differs from the traditional country constituted and trade focused alliances in that it involves people-to-people integration on energy, education and health issues. Overlooking national boundaries and integrating populations rather than markets, ALBA is a decidedly Marxist model, says Derbez.
The disagreement on which model to follow has, in part, prevented Latin America from more fully integrating, and thus from developing a unified voice that commandingly advocates for the region's common interests on the world stage. Curiously, Derbez notes, the three-way divergence that has stalled integration on the continental level is reminiscent of the fractious tripartite conflict found in Mexico's domestic politics, where the PRI, PAN and PRD regularly enter into intense gridlock.
Derbez proposes that if a consensus model of integration is not arrived at, then it may be up to the business sector to exert Latin America's influence on the world. The problem with the so-called multilatinas is that they are generally more dedicated to distribution than to innovation. Suitable examples are found in Mexico where some of the most successful companies distribute telecommunication goods and services or specialize in rational distribution of food products, but do not invent novel technology. Until Latin American industry begins to offer revolutionary products, it will remain on the margins of the world's balance sheets and attention spans.
(Interestingly, where international business is involved, Derbez does not express the same discomfort about borderless integration that he did in reference to the ALBA case. Implicitly, Derbez seems to approve of capital ignoring political borders, but frowns on social movements doing so.)A final characteristic of Latin America that impedes regional integration, common cause, and unity of purpose is the anti-democratic tendencies still found among the continent's political leadership. Derbez points out that the excesses of presidentialism still rear their ugly heads.
Supposedly, Latin American citizens have confidence in strong leaders that make firm decisions, regardless of whether they violate institutional norms. So we see Latin American presidents acting increasingly dictatorially, in defiance of constitutional limitations and other branches of government. Examples include Hugo Chavez reconstituting Venezuela's Supreme Court and proposing an end to term limits, and Alvaro Uribe gaining extra terms by meddling with the legislative and judicial branches. Derbez takes pains to note that this anti-democratic nature finds expression in both right wing and leftist administrations.
(However, Derbez fails to explain why such an anti-democratic trend occurs especially in Latin America. This makes his contention rest rather shakily on a premise of discredited essentialism.)This anti-democratic prong of Derbez's thesis seems to assert that as long as domestic institutions remain weak, designs for integrationist institutions will not gain traction.
Despite the impassioned rhetoric and strategic vision exhibited by Latin American leaders, the region has yet to integrate effectively. Disagreements over the route to follow—on whether to take the form of a common market or to adopt a more humanist community model, on whether to adopt a US-centric perspective or a more southerly orientation—have delayed the realization of Nuestra America. Also, the failure of Latin American businesses to develop a reputation for innovation has prevented that sector from serving as an influential de facto representative of the area's mutual interests. Finally, the disregard for democratic institutions at the national level has not only further entrenched political stereotypes about the region, but also slowed progress towards the formation of hemispheric institutions. According to Derbez, the totality of these dilemmas has obstructed the path to integration.
However long Latin America continues to be fragmented, it will not be able to formulate coherent claims on the world stage; it will not command the deference given to other major power blocks in the prosecution of international affairs. In a word, Latin America will remain irrelevant.
